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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No.  17-3290 
   
  
KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. and C.H.;  
ZIA SHAIKH, for himself and as parent of M.S., S.S., and H.S. 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; MICHELLE M. SMITH;  
STUART RABNER 
 
 
Zia Shaikh,  
Appellant 
        
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  3:16-cv-01189) 
District Judge:  Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
      
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on July 13, 2018 
 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 16, 2018) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
This appeal arises from the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss Appellant 
Zia Shaikh’s amended complaint with prejudice.1 Shaikh filed an amended complaint 
against the State of New Jersey, the Governor of New Jersey, the Attorney General of 
New Jersey, the Clerk of the New Jersey Superior Court, and the Chief Justice of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court (Collectively, the “State”). Shaikh challenged the 
constitutionality of the New Jersey custody dispute framework by arguing that it limits 
his fundamental right to care for and nurture his children and restricts his ability to be 
heard at a plenary hearing.2 
The State moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) and (6). The District Court granted the State’s motion and dismissed Shaikh’s 
amended complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1This case is listed as Hagberg v. New Jersey, but Karl Hagberg, who was involved in the 
initial lawsuit, failed to make a timely appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) and 
(a)(3). Hagberg also did not appeal the District Court’s January 3, 2018 order denying his 
motion for an extension of time to appeal. Thus, we cannot and do not consider 
Hagberg’s claims on appeal. 
2 In New Jersey family courts, a plenary hearing is held under certain circumstances 
when a judge is considering a motion by one of the parties. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
In October of 2013, Appellant Zia Shaikh filed for divorce from Laura 
Germandig-Shaikh (“Germandig”). Together, Shaikh and Germandig had three children.  
On April 2, 2014, Germandig moved to evict Shaikh from the home and obtain full 
custody of their children. 
On April 23, 2014, Germandig’s counsel appeared in New Jersey family court for 
a case management conference, but Shaikh had not been notified of the conference and 
his counsel did not attend. During this conference, Germandig’s counsel applied for an 
order to show cause for full custody of the children, and submitted an affidavit accusing 
Shaikh of verbal harassment and physical abuse of one of his daughters. The family court 
issued the order, which granted Germandig sole legal and physical custody, and 
prohibited Shaikh from entering the home. Shaikh alleges that the family court order was 
granted based on Germandig’s concern that he “may try to take the children.”3 A. 33-34. 
On June 13, 2014, the New Jersey family court heard oral argument on 
Germandig’s motion. Shaikh appeared pro se and denied the allegations of child abuse 
and Germandig’s assertion that he was a Pakistani national planning to flee the country. 
At this hearing, the family court: (1) awarded Germandig full physical custody; (2) 
                                              
3 Shaikh claims that the family court terminated his custody in large part because Shaikh 
was born in Pakistan (even though he is a naturalized United States citizen who has been 
living in the U.S. for 26 years) and claims that the court accepted the argument that 
because of his national origin, Shaikh posed a risk of abducting his children and taking 
them to a foreign country. 
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suspended Shaikh’s parenting time with his daughter indefinitely; (3) allowed Shaikh two 
short visits each week with his other two children, but no overnight visits; (4) stated 
Shaikh and Germandig would mediate the issue of custody; (5) ruled that Shaikh could 
request a plenary hearing if no custody agreement was reached; (6) ordered Shaikh to 
attend anger management; and (7) ordered Shaikh to turn over a variety of documents 
including his passport. Shaikh failed to comply with these directives, and in August of 
2014, the family court suspended all of his parenting time. 
On December 12, 2014, the family court denied Shaikh’s request for joint legal 
custody because he “had not shown changed circumstances.” A. 35. About a year later, in 
December of 2015, the family court denied Shaikh parenting time with one child but 
awarded him nine-and-a-half hours of supervised parenting time per week with his other 
two children. In opposition, Shaikh claims these orders were entered “without a plenary 
hearing and without any finding of abuse or neglect.” Id. 
 B.  Procedural History 
  
 Shaikh filed a four-count complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against the Honorable Marlene Lynch Ford, the Superior Court 
Judge presiding over his custody dispute. Judge Ford moved to dismiss the case. Shaikh 
opposed Judge Ford’s motion to dismiss and cross-moved to file an amended complaint. 
The District Court granted Judge Ford’s motion to dismiss and granted Shaikh’s cross-
motion to amend as long as the claims asserted against Defendant Judge Ford were 
omitted. 
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Following the District Court’s order, Shaikh filed an amended complaint against 
the State. In the complaint, Shaikh stated the following four claims: (1) that he was 
deprived his parental rights without a hearing; (2) that the New Jersey family court 
custody dispute framework violates the U.S. Constitution by resolving custody disputes 
between parents using the “best interests of the child” standard instead of the 
“exceptional circumstances” standard, and also by using a “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard of proof instead of a “clear and convincing evidence” standard; (3) 
that the State violated the Equal Protection Clause in custody disputes between parents by 
using the “best interests” standard instead of the “exceptional circumstances” standard by 
favoring mothers over fathers, by not providing counsel to indigent parents, and by not 
attempting to reunite families; and (4) that Shaikh was entitled to a declaratory judgment 
because “fundamental rights, including parental rights, may not be taken away without 
due process.” A. 70-79. The State moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 
and (6). The District Court granted the State’s motion and dismissed Shaikh’s amended 
complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2014). We must accept all pled allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff. McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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III. DISCUSSION  
Shaikh raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the New Jersey family court’s 
use of the “best interests of the child” standard in deciding custody disputes between two 
parents was proper; (2) whether the standard of proof used in custody disputes between 
parents should be “preponderance of the evidence” rather than by “clear and convincing 
evidence”; and (3) whether family court litigants should be entitled to plenary hearings as 
a matter of due process, so that the court should be enjoined from denying such hearings 
in the future.4 
A. The Best Interests Standard is the Correct Standard for Resolving 
Custody Disputes Between Parents. 
 
The District Court stated that there is a fundamental difference between a custody 
dispute involving two parents and a custody dispute involving one parent and the State. 
For example, when a custody dispute is between two parents, each is “presumed to be 
equally entitled to custody.” Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 568 (N.J. 2000). This is 
because each parent has a fundamental right to care for and nurture their children. 
Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A2d 710, 721 (N.J. 2003); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (noting “the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the 
best interest of his or her child.”). In contrast, custody disputes involving one parent and 
the State differ because in those situations, the parent is the only party presumed to be 
entitled to custody. Watkins, 748 A.2d at 568. In those situations, a court cannot deprive a 
parent of his or her fundamental right to care for and nurture their child without showing 
                                              
4 Shaikh did not appeal the District Court’s order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), dismissing his equal protection claim for a lack of standing. 
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proof of gross misconduct, abandonment, unfitness, or the existence of exceptional 
circumstances. Id. at 559. Thus, in a custody dispute, the parties involved will dictate the 
standard a family court must use to determine which party will be awarded custody. Id. at 
568. 
Here, the custody dispute was between two parents. Thus, each has a fundamental 
right to care for and nurture their children and neither’s right is greater than the other’s. 
Sacharow, 826 A.2d at 721. In these situations, the best interests standard is the correct 
standard a family court judge should use to make a reasonable decision as to which of the 
parents will be awarded custody.5 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993). The 
District Court correctly concluded that this standard does not limit a parent’s fundamental 
right to parenthood because, “by submitting their [custody] dispute to the court, it is the 
parties themselves who essentially seek the impairment of each other’s rights.” 
Sacharow, 826 A.2d at 721. Thus, using the best interests standard allows each parent the 
opportunity to rebut the other’s presumption that entitles them to custody of the children. 
See Watkins, 748 A.2d at 568.  
Since this dispute was between two parents, the District Court correctly upheld the 
family court’s use of the best interests of the child standard when determining which 
parent would gain custody of the children. 
                                              
5 The best interests standard allows a family court judge to weigh a variety of factors 
when making a custody determination between two parents. Some of those factors 
include: the child’s needs, the parents’ ability to cooperate in matters relating to the child, 
the interaction and relationship between the child and his or her parents and siblings, the 
history of domestic violence, the fitness of the parents, the parents’ employment 
responsibilities, and the stability of the home environment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4(c). 
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B.  Preponderance of the Evidence is the Proper Standard of Proof in 
Custody Disputes Between Parents. 
 
Shaikh argues that the family court erred by using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof to resolve his custody dispute rather than a clear and convincing 
evidence standard. Shaikh argues that the family court should require clear and 
convincing evidence even in disputes between two parents, if the court is awarding one of 
the parents less than equal custody. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a State cannot terminate parental 
rights without “clear and convincing evidence.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 
(1982). However, in Santosky the custody dispute was between one parent and a third 
party, not two parents. Id. In such situations, courts should apply the heightened clear and 
convincing standard. This standard applies in order to protect individuals who are 
engaged in government-initiated proceedings, in which the outcome could threaten the 
individual involved with a “significant deprivation of liberty or ‘stigma.’” Id. at 756. 
Courts follow this heightened standard because of the vast resources afforded by the State 
and the potential result of a parent’s complete and irrevocable loss of parental rights. Id. 
at 761-63 (citation omitted). 
In contrast, the result of a custody dispute between two parents does not result in 
the complete and irrevocable loss of parental rights or involve a vast disparity in litigation 
resources between the parties. Hand v. Hand, 917 A.2d 269, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007). Thus, an order establishing a custody arrangement between parents is 
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inherently temporary, since it can always be modified on a showing of changed 
circumstances. Id. 
Shaikh alleges that the clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate 
because there is no difference between a custody dispute involving two parents and one 
involving one parent and the State. However, as the District Court correctly stated, 
Shaikh “failed to cite any controlling precedent to support [his] argument that courts 
should apply the same standard of review in custody disputes between parents that is 
applied when a third party seeks to interfere with a parent’s rights.” A. 16. He also fails to 
cite any such cases before us. The District Court concluded that the limitations placed on 
Shaikh’s custody were not “final and irrevocable” deprivations of rights that would 
require the Court to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard. Santosky, 455 U.S. 
at 759. In addition, the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate when both 
parties have an equal risk of error, which is the case in custody disputes between two 
parents. Id. at 755. 
Therefore, the District Court was correct to apply the preponderance of the 
evidence standard over the clear and convincing standard because Shaikh’s custody 
dispute was between two parents. 
 C.  Family Court Litigants Are Not Entitled to a Plenary Hearing as a Matter 
of Course and Cannot Enjoin Future Denials of Such Hearings. 
 
 Shaikh challenges the constitutionality of New Jersey’s custody dispute 
framework under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that 
he suffered a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
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because the New Jersey family court has the ability to modify his custody arrangement 
without holding a plenary hearing. 
 First, Shaikh brings a facial challenge. A facial challenge “tests a law’s 
constitutionality based on its text alone and does not consider the fact or circumstances of 
a particular case.” U.S. v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, the New 
Jersey law provides family court litigants with the opportunity for a plenary hearing on 
custody issues at various stages of litigation. See, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 4:67-5; N.J. Ct R. 1:6-
2(f); N.J. Ct. R. 5:8-6. Its Court rules state that before a plenary hearing will be held, a 
party must make a prima facie showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact that 
would warrant a hearing; otherwise, judges can decide the matter without a hearing. See 
Hand, 917 A.2d at 271. 
 In order for Shaikh to meet the heavy burden associated with facial challenges he 
“must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged policy] 
would be valid.” U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Essentially, Shaikh argues 
that in every single custody dispute, due process requires a plenary hearing.  That is not 
the case. See Pfeiffer v. Ilson, 722 A.2d 966, 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) 
(finding that “a plenary hearing is not necessary in every case”). For these reasons, we 
affirm the District Court’s decision denying Shaikh’s facial challenge of the New Jersey 
custody dispute framework.  
Additionally, Shaikh asks for injunctive and declaratory relief seeking to prevent 
the family court from denying his plenary hearing requests in future custody proceedings. 
This would require the federal District Court to exert control over the New Jersey family 
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court’s day-to-day operations. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500-01 (1974). Here, 
the District Court concluded that it is not the job of the federal court to sit in constant 
supervision of the New Jersey family court, which would essentially “transform federal 
courts into family courts.”Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 995 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, 
the District Court was correct to deny Shaikh injunctive and declaratory relief.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
